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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAKOTA JAMES MCKEETH,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43989
Ada County Case No.
CR-2015-6989

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has McKeeth failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea to
attempted robbery?

McKeeth Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
McKeeth pled guilty to attempted robbery and the district court imposed a unified
sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.38-40.)
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Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.
(R., pp.49-50.) McKeeth filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.51-53.)
McKeeth asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his status as a first-time
felon, substance abuse problems, purported remorse, employment history, and support
from family and friends. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-7.) The record supports the sentence
imposed.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
The maximum prison sentence for attempted robbery is 15 years. I.C. §§ 18306(1), -6503. The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years
fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines.

(R., pp.38-40.) Furthermore,

McKeeth’s sentence is appropriate in light of the seriousness of the offense, his ongoing
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substance abuse and failure to complete the treatment programs offered to him, and his
high risk to reoffend.
The offense of attempted robbery is serious. Wearing “dark sunglasses” and a
sweatshirt, which he wore with the hood up, McKeeth presented a note to pharmacy
staff “demanding Hydromorphone while stating that he was armed” and directing the
pharmacy technician to “keep her hands where he could see them.” (PSI, pp.104-05. 1)
The pharmacy technician told him that she would need to retrieve a key from the
pharmacist because the prescriptions were “locked up”; McKeeth responded by “telling
her that she needed to make it quick.” (PSI, pp.105-06.) The technician walked to the
back of the pharmacy and McKeeth “took off,” reportedly believing that she was
contacting the police.

(PSI, pp.106, 126-27.)

He subsequently ran to a nearby

abandoned house and changed or took off his sweatshirt. (PSI, pp.126-27.)
In the weeks following the attempted robbery, McKeeth “bragged” to his
neighbors and family members “about committing the robbery” and “getting away with
it.” (PSI, pp.126-27.) McKeeth’s family believed that McKeeth “burned his shoes and
the hooded sweatshirt he was wearing” during the attempted robbery so that there
would be “nothing to tie him to the robbery.”

(PSI, pp.127-28.)

McKeeth’s family

members told officers that McKeeth also “steals” his mother’s prescription pain
medications and, even when she locked them up in a safe, McKeeth “broke into the
safe and takes the pills.” (PSI, pp.127-28.) McKeeth’s neighbors, who “called into
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
“MCKEETH 43989 psi.pdf.”
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crime stoppers and reported [McKeeth] as the suspect of the robbery,” also reported
that McKeeth “appears to be dealing pills out of [his] house” and they “recently caught
[McKeeth] tampering with [their] motorcycle.”

(PSI, p.126.)

When officers finally

arrested McKeeth in May 2015 (approximately seven months after he committed the
instant offense), he “denied committing the crime.” (PSI, p.131.) The nature of the
offense supports the sentencing discretion of the district court.
Likewise, McKeeth’s substance abuse supports the sentence. McKeeth began
abusing drugs at a young age, reporting he began using alcohol at age 12; “Benzos” at
age 13; Hydrocodone at age 14; cannabis, opiates, and amphetamines at age 16; LSD,
Oxycodone (via smoking), and cocaine at age 17; and designer stimulants and “other
hallucinogens” at age 18.

(PSI, pp.20-21, 72-73.) McKeeth blames his substance

abuse problems solely on the fact that he was prescribed Norco “for his pain” following
an attack and beating he suffered, specifically claiming that “the attack … led to his
substance abuse problems.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp.4, 7.)

The evidence, however,

shows extensive substance abuse in the years preceding the “attack,” which occurred
shortly before his nineteenth birthday. (PSI, pp.21, 34.) McKeeth told the presentence
investigator that, although he took prescription Norco for a time following the attack, he
was eventually able to stop taking the Norco and took ibuprofen instead, which does not
indicate that he was dependent on the narcotic to manage the pain from his injuries.
(PSI, p.21.)

Despite this, McKeeth deliberately “continued to obtain Norco via

prescriptions and stockpiled the pills.” (PSI, p.21.) At some later point in time, he
“began taking some of the Norco pills and then ‘ran into someone’ who,” he claims, “‘got
[him] to take more.’” (PSI, p.21.)

4

McKeeth reported that he subsequently began using methamphetamine and also
became a “regular” user of “‘Oxy’s and Diluadid,’” at age 19, which was around the
same time that he first started Methadone treatment; however, he discontinued
Methadone treatment “because he was still using drugs ‘heavily.’” (PSI, pp.20-21, 68,
73.) McKeeth subsequently progressed to intravenous use of “‘Oxy’s’” and Diluadid,
and “‘then started with heroin’” at age 19 or 20. (PSI, pp.20-21, 68, 72.) Although
McKeeth was provided the opportunity to participate in several substance abuse
treatment programs, including programs at Intermountain Hospital and at Bow Creek in
2014, he habitually remained in treatment only for a day or so before “walk[ing] out.”
(PSI, pp.13, 69, 127.)

He also participated in Methadone treatment at “Raise the

Bottom Training & Counseling Services” between July and September 2014, but was
discharged after he “left against staff advice.” (PSI, p.79.)
McKeeth claimed that, at the time that he committed the instant offense in
October 2014, he “‘had been withdrawing from opiates for two days’”; however, rather
than returning to Methadone treatment, he decided to rob a pharmacy to “‘ease the
craving.’” (PSI, p.14.) Contrary to McKeeth’s characterization of his decision to commit
a robbery as purely spontaneous, it appears that some amount of planning went into the
robbery attempt, as he took the time to conceal his identity both before and after he
committed the offense.

(PSI, pp.14, 104-05, 126-27.)

According to his neighbors,

McKeeth “normally keeps a blond beard,” but he “shaved it off just prior to committing
the robbery” (and grew it back afterward). (PSI, p.126.)
McKeeth resumed Methadone treatment in December 2014 or January 2015.
(PSI, p.21.) He was discharged from the program in July 2015 after he again left the
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clinic “against staff advice” on several occasions.

(PSI, pp.54, 80.)

Program staff

reported that McKeeth continued to use opiates and THC “for [the] duration of services”
and that he “did not engage in regular counseling and missed several appointments.”
(PSI, p.54.) The substance abuse evaluator subsequently recommended that McKeeth
participate in a residential treatment program. (PSI, pp.81, 92.) However, in the letters
of support submitted by McKeeth’s friends and family members, it was noted that
inpatient treatment programs “did not work for [McKeeth],” apparently because he would
not stay in the programs. (PSI, pp.35, 39.) Several of the individuals who wrote in
support of McKeeth recommended that he participate in the rider program. (PSI, pp.36,
39.) The presentence investigator determined that McKeeth presents a high risk to
reoffend, and stated that the retained jurisdiction program “could provide Mr. McKeeth
an opportunity to show the Court he is serious about making changes in his life.” (PSI,
pp.23, 26.) The evidence shows that substance abuse played a significant role in the
crime, but also that efforts at rehabilitation in the community were likely to fail.
At sentencing, the state likewise recommended the retained jurisdiction program,
with an underlying unified sentence of 10 years, with three years fixed. (8/24/15 Tr.,
p.6, Ls.18-21.)

The state advised that its recommendation was “motivated by” the

nature of the offense, the severity of McKeeth’s addictions, and “the significant need
here for some intervention to actually cause and motivate change in the defendant.”
(8/24/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-9.) The state noted the negative impact of the crime on the
community and particularly on the victim, who was “severely traumatized” (8/24/15 Tr.,
p.8, Ls.17-25), and that McKeeth’s conduct in the instant offense was selfish, reckless,
and demonstrated “significant” problems with his thinking and decision-making, which
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go beyond “just his addiction to substances” and “need[ ] to get that next high” (8/24/15
Tr., p.9, Ls.3-11). The state further argued, “[F]rankly at this point I don’t think he is
appropriate to be placed in the community based on the serious nature of the crime
here and the very serious problems of his thinking. And that his addiction can lead him
at least in his own words to committing these kinds [of] crimes and [sic] certainly
concerning to the State.” (8/24/15 Tr., p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.4.) The district court similarly
stated:
This is a very serious kind of case. Any case that involves a direct
threat with another human being rises pretty much to the top of the list of
serious offenses. Because while many people might, you know, take
something that nobody is looking at or you find ways to use illegal drugs
and trade illegal drugs, to go into [a] situation where you are going to tell
another human being face to face that they need to do something you
want because you are armed, that’s a pretty serious level of terrible
judgment. And it’s a pretty strong indicator of just how far things have
gone wrong.
(8/24/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.11-23.) The court also noted that McKeeth had failed to follow
through with the numerous treatment opportunities he had previously been granted, and
concluded that community-based treatment was not appropriate. (8/24/15 Tr., p.16,
Ls.19-25; p.18, Ls.7-12.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed,
and retained jurisdiction to provide McKeeth the opportunity to complete treatment in a
structured setting. (8/24/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.8-17; p.18, Ls.3-6.) The court advised, “I
would like to see how you respond to the treatment in a structured setting. I would like
to see that you really want to go through with it and that you do want to follow through
on treatment.

Frankly, I think you would do a better job if you had some more

comprehensive treatment before we look at other options.” (8/24/15 Tr., p.17, L.24 –
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p.18, L.6.) The sentence imposed is appropriate in light of the serious nature of the
offense, the harm done to the victim, the severity of McKeeth’s substance abuse issues
and his failure to complete treatment in the community, and his high risk to reoffend.
Given any reasonable view of the facts, McKeeth has failed to establish an abuse of
discretion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm McKeeth’s conviction and
sentence.

DATED this 8th day of November, 2016.

__/s/_________________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of November, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_________________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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